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The Quest to Implant the Civilian Method in
Louisiana: Tracing the Origins of Judicial
Methodology
Vernon Valentine Palmer∗
It is my great honor to deliver The Tucker Lecture tonight, and
I am humbled by recalling the illustrious figures who have stood at
this lectern in the past.1 None, of course, can be considered more
illustrious than Colonel John Tucker, Jr., himself, whose memory
is so fittingly honored each year by his alma mater. The year 2012
marks the 300th anniversary of the arrival of the Coutume de Paris
in Louisiana, and it also marks the 200th anniversary of our
statehood constitution, as well as the founding of our supreme
court. I thought it would be fitting to choose a subject related to
and worthy of the civil law that John Tucker loved. He was (and I
use this word circumspectly) a jurisconsult in the true sense of the
word, a scholar in action, who founded the Louisiana Law
Institute, was virtually its only president for many years, and then
served as its “animateur” until his death. After choosing what I
thought was a fitting topic, I happened to discover that Colonel
Tucker actually taught a course at Tulane for many years entitled
“Civil Law Method and Technique.” I am therefore slightly
intimidated to think what the real master of the subject might have
done with the theme of this Lecture. I want to thank LSU for
honoring him and for allowing me to deliver this Lecture.
In 1832 when Alexis de Tocqueville came to New Orleans
during his famous journey across the United States, he was still
gathering notes for his classic work, La Démocracie en Amérique.
He tells us that he had a conversation with a “very well-known
New Orleans lawyer whose name I have forgotten.”2 The lawyer
that he met is believed to have been Etienne Mazureau, a greatly
admired intellect who spoke four languages fluently and who had
total command of the Spanish–Roman–French laws comprising the
Louisiana legal system. According to de Tocqueville’s notes,
Mazureau spoke about a fateful act of the legislature that was
passed only a few years before:
Copyright 2013, by VERNON VALENTINE PALMER.
∗ Thomas Pickles Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Eason Weinmann
Center for Comparative Law, Tulane University.
1. This Article reproduces the text of The 36th Annual Tucker Lecture,
which I delivered on November 17, 2011, at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University.
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 106 (J. P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Yale Univ. Press 1960).
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Late in 1828, at the end of a session, a bill was passed
unnoticed repealing these laws [the Spanish laws] in a body
without putting anything else in their place. Waking up the
next day the bar and the judges discovered with horror what
had been done the day before. But the thing was done.3
What was “the thing” that was done and why should the judges
and the bar have reacted with “horror”? What was the historical
significance of that moment in 1828? Some of Mazureau’s
contemporaries apparently feared that this wholesale repeal of
Spanish law was a wholesale disaster, but perhaps they were too
close to the events to grasp its meaning. And what is its relevance
to us today? Many present-day lawyers and students have not
grasped its significance either because its place in history has been
largely forgotten. Tonight, I want to place that act and a series of
other events leading up to it in perspective. I will picture them as
part of a broad quest—indeed, perhaps an unfinished quest—to
implant a truly civilian methodology in Louisiana. My subject may
be historical, but it is not antiquarian; it is ultimately modern and
relevant to understanding the legal system that we have today.
Before proceeding further, I want to explain what I mean by
implanting civilian method. There are many aspects to legal method
and legal reasoning. There are the methods of the legislator, the
methods of the scholar, and the methods of the judge—perhaps
enough to furnish material for ten Tucker lectures. But tonight, I
wish to consider a fundamental objective that I believe is the sine
qua non of all other methodological considerations. It is to ensure
that the Civil Code occupies the center of the system, that it is the
epicenter of civil law reasoning, so that all jurisprudential
development starts with and comes through the Code. This
aspiration is summarized by a famous epigram of Gény’s, as
reshaped by Saleilles: “Au delá du code, mais par le code civil.”
(That is, “Beyond the code, but through the civil code.”)4 The Civil
Code of Quebec claims this central position for itself in a very
forceful first article:

3. Thomas W. Tucker, Interpretations of the Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808–
1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 57, 169
(2004) (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 106).
4. The phrase may be ascribed to Saleilles, who slightly modified Gény’s
approach by turning it around. Saleilles inverted Gény’s expression “par le Code
civil, mais au delà du Code civil” and thus emphasized interpretation taking the
law beyond the Code. See R. Saleilles, Préface to FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, at xviii (1899).
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The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all
matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions,
lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In
these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws,
although other laws may complement the Code or make
exceptions to it.5
My address concerns this very aspiration and the earliest attempts
in our history to achieve it.
In consequence, I am not going to speak about certain issues
that are often connected to discussions of legal method. I will not
be principally focused upon the accidentals of method, such as the
style or length of decisions, whether the jurisprudence is used
openly or covertly, the syllogistic or nonsyllogistic form of the
judgment, the use of deductive versus inductive reasoning, whether
decisions are anonymous, and so forth. These are factors of great
interest that the civilian tradition and each national history has
shaped individually and differently, but the incidental must not
obscure what, to my mind, is the most basic issue. When I speak of
the quest to establish civilian method in the formative years, I will
be discussing attempts to establish the centrality of the code within
the legal order.
This is never an easy accomplishment, and there is a part of me
that says that, even today, it has never been completely achieved in
our state. From the very beginning of our modern system, which I
would say took place roughly in the years 1803–1808, there was an
“inner tension,” or perhaps it could be called an intellectual collision,
between civil law and common law. Our judicial methodology was
almost immediately caught in the conflict between the ideology
brought with the codes from Europe and the American-style common
law legal institutions that were immediately put into place. Adding to
the conflict was the immediate large-scale reception of American and
English common law in distinct legal sectors surrounding the codes,
namely in the areas of commercial law, civil procedure, criminal law,
and criminal procedure. I will attempt in a moment to show you the
common law encirclement of the Civil Code more graphically, but
first let me describe the ideological conflict.
Louisiana’s first codifications were, by any definition,
European-style codifications of high quality, and yet, they were
expected to prosper in the midst of an alien institutional and
procedural environment. The ideology brought with the codes
presupposed a modest role for the judge and a strict separation of
powers, which took away the previous lawmaking powers of the
5. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, preliminary provision (Can.).
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judges of the ancien régime. In a word, the codes placed the judge
under the code. To any common law judge accustomed to the
normality of case-to-case legal development and greater discretion,
a civil code of that kind is something of a subjection, an
undignified and tight fitting garment.6 At the time of the French
Revolution (which was not long before Louisiana’s modern system
was founded), French thought did not concede that the judge was a
lawmaker at all, and it sometimes did not concede that the judge
was a law interpreter. As Clermont-Tonnere said in ringing terms:
“The judicial power, or that which one improperly calls the
judicial power, is the application of the law (loi) or general will to
a particular fact, thus in the final analysis it is nothing but the
execution of the law.”7 France’s 1789 Draft Constitution on
Judicial Power declared, “No judge will be permitted in whatever
manner, to interpret the law (la loi).”8 Then, of course, there was
Robespierre’s violent dictum: “This word jurisprudence ought to
be erased from our language. In a State that has a constitution, a
legislation, the jurisprudence of the courts is nothing but law
(loi).”9 These declarations of course sound bizarre and extreme to
American ears, both then and now. The American judges
appointed by President Jefferson and Governor Claiborne in the
period 1804–1808 were certainly not cut in this mold.10 They knew
nothing of the French reformatory. They had not been guilty of any
of the abuses associated with the French parlements. They
inhabited a different universe. These were judges in the common
law mold, who possessed the power of judicial review to test the
validity of legislation and who exercised certain undefined,
inherent powers established over the course of history, e.g., the
6. Historically, the tension in the relationship is captured in Edward
Livingston’s plan to deny Louisiana judges the power to create precedents when
the code was silent and in requiring them to make an annual “circumstantial
account” of decisions of this kind to the general assembly. For details of the plan
and the reasons for its rejection, see Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Many Guises
of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, in
AEQUITAS AND EQUITY: EQUITY IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 402–
06 (A. M. Rabello ed., 1997).
7. Michel Troper, La Notion de Pouvoir Judiciaire au Début de la
Révolution Française, in 1791: LA PREMIÈRE CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE 358
(1993) (quote freely translated); Philippe Raynaud, La Loi et la Jurisprudence,
des Lumières à la Révolution Française, in 30 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU
DROIT 60–61 (1985).
8. 1789 DRAFT CONST. ON JUDICIAL POWER, art. 9 (Fr.). This text became
the substance of article 12 of the law of 16–24 August, 1790.
9. GÉNY, supra note 4, § 45.
10. See generally Robert B. Fisher, Jr., The Louisiana Supreme Court,
1812–1846: Strangers in a Strange Land, 1 TUL. CIV. L.F., no. 4, 1973, at 1.
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contempt power. They were acknowledged law creators,
policymakers, and prestigious figures in the community. When
they immigrated to Louisiana, they brought with them certain
intellectual possessions and artifacts, such as the English form of
judgment, an inclination for case-by-case reasoning, a discursive
and argumentative style, the individually authored opinion and the
permissible dissenting opinion, and a high regard for the authority
of Blackstone and the brilliance of Mansfield. We should not be
surprised that Governor Claiborne—himself a common lawyer—
would call the first court that he created in the Territory of Orleans
the “Court of Common Pleas,” nor regard as a coincidence that
Judge Martin modeled his first law reports on the precise format of
Douglas’s Reports of King’s Bench Cases.
Our first judges had no prior experience with codes or codal
interpretation. They were not acquainted with the civilian world of
Justinian, Febrero, Domat, and Pothier, and their initial encounter
with codification would be, in my view, an unpredictable element
in our history.
Let me remind you briefly of their backgrounds, particularly the
four justices who dominated our supreme court in the first crucial
decades. F.X. Martin of North Carolina (but born in Marseilles) was
a printer and translator and had served in the North Carolina
Legislature. He had prior judicial experience as a judge in the
adjoining Mississippi Territory before receiving his appointment to
the Orleans Territorial Superior Court. He was appointed to the
supreme court in 1815 and served on that court for the next 31 years,
mostly as presiding judge.11 George Mathews of Georgia learned
law in the law offices of his brother in Augusta, Georgia. He was a
judge in the Mississippi Territory for two years before his
appointment to the Orleans Superior Court in 1806. He sat on the
Louisiana Supreme Court from 1813–1836. Pierre-Charles Derbigny
was born into a noble French family in northern France. His studies
in Paris were interrupted by the French Revolution, and he
immigrated (or perhaps fled) to Louisiana, taking a circuitous
itinerary through St. Domingue, Pittsburgh, Florida, and Cuba,
finally reaching New Orleans in 1797 when Louisiana was still
under Spanish occupation.12 Derbigny served on the court from
11. He has been described as a man of great erudition and strong will,
whose views were “as fixed as the North Star.” Symeon C. Symeonides, The
Louisiana Judge: Judge, Statesman, Politician, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A
MIXED JURISDICTION 89, 97 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1999) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Derbigny studied law at St. Genevieve in Paris; however, it is unclear
how far he progressed in his studies, given that he left France in 1790 at the age
of 21. For biographical details, see Judith F. Gentry, Pierre Auguste Bourguignon
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1813–1820, when he resigned to run for Governor. Finally,
Alexander Porter, an Irish immigrant who settled in Tennessee and
practiced law in that state before coming to Louisiana, took his place
and sat on the supreme court from 1820–1833.
These legal pioneers were “strangers in a strange land” as
Robert Fisher has called them.13 They were beginning a cultural
journey. My point is surely not to stress their deficiencies, for some
of these men were outstanding jurists by any measure in any time
(Martin and Porter, I believe, were shining examples) and in the
fullness of time became expert exponents of the civil law. My
interest lies in the challenge that they faced in their conflicted bijural
legal culture and in what I believe emerged as an instinctual
resistance to all efforts to restrict their discretion and subject
themselves to a true code system.
Let me make my point in different terms: Here was a strange
mixed marriage of European codes and American judges, and,
whatever its merits (Justice Tate said it represented the “best of both
worlds”),14 I believe that it was destined to be a life of turbulent
monogamy. It would take considerable effort to subject these
common law minds to a European code. The tension, if not
contradiction between the nature of the codes and the culture of the
justice, would make it difficult for a method worthy of a code to
take root.
But let me not forget a second, an equally formidable, obstacle
in any quest to establish a civil code at the center of the legal
system—the Territory of Orleans was already, even before the first
civil code arrived on the scene, a highly compartmentalized legal
system, heavily mixed with common law.
I. A SYSTEM PRE-MIXED FROM THE OUTSET
We must not think for a moment that the Territory of Orleans or
Louisiana was ever intended or designed to be a pure civil law

Derbigny, Arnaud Julie Beauvais, Jacques Dupré, Governors, 1828–1831, in THE
LOUISIANA GOVERNORS: FROM IBERVILLE TO EDWARDS 103, 103–05 (Joseph G.
Dawson III ed., 1990); CARL J. EKBERG, A FRENCH ARISTOCRAT IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: THE SHATTERED DREAMS OF DE LASSUS DE LUZIÈRES 29–38
(2010).
13. See Fisher, Jr., supra note 10.
14. Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The
Louisiana Experience, 20 LOY. L. REV. 231, 231 (1974) (“[T]he judge of a
mixed jurisdiction such as Louisiana has the best of both worlds available to him
for the performance of his judicial function. He may take advantage of the
techniques and perspectives of both legal systems.”).
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island unto itself. The enactment of its first civil codes, in 1808 and
1825, did indeed mark the culmination of a successful struggle on
the part of the French Creoles to keep their old laws—their civil
laws. That was a great cultural victory but not one to be
exaggerated. They kept the civil law in the area of civil law alone,
and they quickly accepted, perhaps too eagerly, the laws of England
and the United States in most other areas of life and law. English
common law and American law immediately commanded the
heights on four broad fronts encircling the civil law. This
encirclement made it unlikely that the civil law would be the
epicenter of the overall system or even the master of its own
individual sphere.15 It is striking that, from the very beginning, legal
method depended entirely on the changing subject matter. The
method had to shift in accordance with the different legal sources
appropriate to each subject matter. A brief overview of these
subjects and sources makes this clear.
II. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL SOURCES IN 1808
It was a system in which the judge in commercial matters had to
apply the uncodified law that merchants built upon American and
English caselaw.16 If a criminal case were presented, the judge
turned to the English and American law of crimes and its caselaw. If
the case concerned private civil law, however, say a question of
family law, he would turn to the Digest of 1808; the related Roman,
Spanish, and French laws; and a host of French and Spanish
commentators. Nevertheless, if some point of civil procedure should
arise in the midst of deciding a civil code question, the same judge
was forced to return to the cases and authorities of the common
law.17 And, yes, there were some cases where all of these sources
and traditions were mixed together in four languages (if I count
Latin) spanning both legal traditions, in a bewildering display of
competing authorities. One is tempted to say there was no “system”
here; rather, there were mismatched parts taken from different
systems and made to function together. How could it be maintained
that the civil code was actually the “epicenter” of such a system? It
was a system with different traditions and sources in defined
compartments but with no defined center. In such a system, the

15. For a chart diagramming this encirclement, see infra Appendix A.
16. See, e.g., Nugent v. Delhomme, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 307 (La. 1812).
17. See, e.g., Bermudez v. Bermudez, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 180 (La. 1812); Hunt v.
Norris, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 517 (La. 1816) (discussing the meaning of the word debt at
common law).
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judges could not be full-time civilians or full-time common lawyers.
They were destined to be full-time hybrids.
So, it is interesting to try to place ourselves, as I tried to place
myself in this research, at the beginning of a new state with its entire
future before it. How did these untrained, fledgling civilian judges
react to a civil code from another continent set in a mixed and
compartmentalized legal landscape? Let me say parenthetically that,
in preparation, I read consecutively the first three volumes of
Martin’s Old Series reports, cover to cover, 1809–1815, as well as
the statute books of the founding period, to try to gain perspective
and data. I cannot pretend to have the kaleidoscopic or wide-angle
lens necessary to do justice to this theme. No one, I believe, can
pretend to speak ex cathedra at a removal of 200 years from the
events that he is describing. Nevertheless, I will try to describe one
central episode of this history—it concerns the failure of the Digest
of 1808 to become the fulcrum of civil law in the Louisiana legal
system.
III. A DIGEST MARGINALIZED BY A IUS COMMUNE
Here we come upon the greatest methodological crossroads at
the founding—it was whether to treat Louisiana’s first code, called
the 1808 Digest, as a true civil code, that is, as a self-contained and
self-sufficient statement of the law, or whether to regard it, as its
own name indicates, as an incomplete and partial statement of a far
larger legal system beyond.
You will recall, and hopefully not dispute, that at the time of the
Louisiana Purchase and into the statehood period, Spanish law
continued in force in southern Louisiana. It was decided by the
Territorial Legislature in 1806, while Claiborne was governor, to
codify the law then in force in the Territory of Orleans. Two
jurisconsults, Louis Moreau Lislet and James Brown, were
commissioned to write the draft. And this draft was accomplished in
less than two years and was promulgated on March 31, 1808, as “A
Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans.”
Now, the purpose of this codification was not only to preserve
and entrench the civil law against the then much-demonized
common law, but also it was to reduce the cognitive demands on
lawyers, judges, and citizens by consolidating in one book and in the
two languages generally spoken in Louisiana the extraordinarily
complex and diffuse Spanish law that governed Spain’s overseas
possessions. That system consisted of more than 20,000 individual
laws that were dispersed in six different compilations. The situation
was astonishingly complex and chaotic. The Preamble to the
enactment succinctly stated simplification as a vital goal:
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Whereas, in the confused state in which the civil laws of
this territory were plunged by the effect of the changes
which happened in its government, it had become
indispensable to make known the laws which have been
preserved . . . and to collect them in a single work, which
might serve as a guide for the decision of the courts and
juries, without recurring to a multiplicity of books, which,
being for the most part written in foreign languages, offer
in their interpretation inexhaustible sources of litigation.18
Now, these were the evils to be overcome, but the Louisiana
Legislature simultaneously took two steps that prevented the 1808
enactment from ever coming close to achieving this goal. First of all,
the Legislature made a decision, on the very eve of promulgation, to
christen the codification a digest—a type of codification thought to
be inferior and quite different than a true civil code.19 Secondly, it
decided, again apparently at the last moment, not to make a full and
express repeal of the background Spanish–Roman law. It inserted in
the enabling act a weak abrogation clause that abolished very little
and left the Spanish–Roman colossus still standing. This text read:
18. 1808 La. Acts 120.
19. Among civilians, this word digest generally connotes a less scientific
type of codification that preceded the modern European codes that came on the
scene beginning in the 1750s and on. A digest may contain disparate kinds of
materials consolidated in one enactment, arranged in some convenient way, and
with little internal coherence. Even an alphabetical arrangement may suffice as
the internal organization of a digest. See Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a
Code—The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1988). In that sense, it might
be compared to a far more important Digest of the 6th century, in which the
Emperor Justinian condensed millions of lines of classical Roman law texts into
50 books. It can be objected, I realize, that I am perhaps superimposing a
modern distinction between a code and a digest that would be unhistorical to
attribute to the Louisiana codifiers of 1808. Put another way, it may be objected
that I am making too much of a distinction, which, considering the state of
contemporary understandings and the codification movement, had not yet
crystallized. The answer is, however, that history says otherwise. The age of
codification actually began in Europe more than 50 years before the French
Civil Code and the Digest of Orleans appeared. Europe had already received the
Bavarian Civil Code (1756), the Codex Theresianus (1753–1766), the
Josephinian Code (1787), the West Galician Code (1797), Malta’s Code de
Rohan (1797), as well as the meticulously prepared Allgemeines Landrecht, or
Prussian Civil Code (1792), which, incidentally, was translated into French to
assist preparation of the Code Napoléon. Because it is unquestioned that the
Code Napoléon served as the formal code model followed by the Louisiana
codifiers, there is ample basis to believe that the difference between a code and a
digest was appreciated both in Europe and in Louisiana at that time. Indeed, why
else would the Louisiana Supreme Court have explicitly relied upon that very
distinction in the Cottin case (1817) as the cornerstone for the “digest
methodology” that it recognized? See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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“That whatever in the ancient civil laws of this territory . . . is
contrary to the dispositions contained in the said digest or
irreconcileable [sic] with them is hereby abrogated.”20
If, instead of that weak repealing clause the Legislature had
expressly repealed all the former laws, that could have put the
Digest on a prominent pedestal alone on the Louisiana stage, and it
might have forced the judges to reason first and foremost through
the code, at least before going au delà du code. Instead, as we shall
see, that weak repealer encouraged the courts to slight, disregard,
and even undermine these codified provisions by routine and
frequent excursuses into obscure Spanish sources.
The combined effect of the Legislature’s timidity in naming the
code a digest and its failure to repeal the bulk of Spanish laws in
force was more than enough for the supreme court to adopt a
methodology suitable to that of a digest, and I shall hereafter call it
the digest method.
The conception was that the Spanish–Roman law found in the
Partidas, the Recopilación of Castille, and the Recopilación of the
Indies was the default legal system. This droit commun or
“common law” would be applicable wherever it was not expressly
or impliedly repealed by Louisiana enactments. Let me be clear
about what this meant—this extensive body of law was not
relevant as merely persuasive authority or comparative authority
(although sometimes that purpose cannot be ruled out altogether).
These laws were cited, set forth, and applied because they
contained controlling texts that bound the court as fully as a statute
or code enacted by the Louisiana Legislature.
To envision for a moment how this system operated, we might
think of a rock placed in a pail of water.21 The rock represents the
1808 Digest. The water in which it is submerged represents the
surrounding Spanish–Roman law. Now, in theory, the Digest was
controlling to the extent that a rock is watertight and displaces the
water (to the extent that it is “contrary” to the water, if you will),
but to the extent that it is not watertight, the water enters into the
cracks, crevices, or porousness in the rock, filling it with Spanish–
Roman laws.
Any displaced water represents the repealed Spanish law that
was deemed contrary or irreconcilable with the statute. The fit
between the two should be seamless. It is interesting to mention
that this same metaphor of the rock and the water is also used by
20. 1808 La. Acts 126.
21. For a visual representation of this image, see infra Appendix B; see also
Beaker 2 Image, http://w3.shorecrest.org/~Lisa_Peck/Physics/All_Projects/photo
journal/blair/beaker2.jpg (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
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common law authors to describe the relationship between a statute
of Parliament and the surrounding common law.22
Now, according to conventional historical accounts of this
period, this symbiotic relationship between the Digest and the
surrounding laws was not apparent at first for some reason, and it
took about nine years before it was discovered that the evils
described in the Preamble had not actually been overcome. The rude
awakening or reckoning, it is said, arrived with the ruling in Cottin
v. Cottin in 1817.23
The facts of Cottin are worth a brief examination. There was a
child who was born alive, but it lived only eight hours and then
died. The question in the case was: Did this child inherit from his
father (who died just before the child’s birth), or did that share of
inheritance go instead to other heirs because this was an abortive
child who, legally speaking, never existed? By the rules found in
the Digest of 1808 and by the rules of the Roman law, the child
born alive should inherit in such a situation. In contrast, an
abortive child, or, as the Digest defined it, one “either born dead or
incapable of living,”24 should not inherit. This child, however, was
ostensibly capable of living and thus qualified as an heir.25 In
Spain, however, the laws had a particular disposition that, to be
considered naturally born, and not abortive, the child must live at
least 24 hours. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 24-hour
requirement of Spanish law must apply here. Since it was not
contrary to the Digest, it was not repealed. It only added an extra
requisite to the definition there stated. Judge Derbigny then stated
his rationale:
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest of
the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as
untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments,
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such
parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary
to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.26

22. See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1995).
23. 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817).
24. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 1, tit. 1, art. 6 (1808) [hereinafter DIGEST OF
1808].
25. See id. bk. 3, tit. 1, art. 65.
26. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) at 94.
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It may be of interest to note how Judge Derbigny himself,
while emphasizing that it is a digest, twice calls it a code, all in one
and the same sentence.
Now Shakespeare asked a famous question in Romeo and Juliet:
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose [b]y any other name
would smell as sweet.”27
Could it be that that which we call a digest might, by any other
name, produce all the effects and have the same properties as a civil
code? No, I am afraid that is not what the supreme court wished to
say. The Cottin court’s position was that a digest is really a different
object than a code, a different kind codification. Even if you called it
a code, it would remain a digest true to its own nature. Their logic
was impeccable––the legislative intent was to create a distinct
object, and that object brought with it the method of a digest.
And yet, allow me to state that there is something amiss in this
logic as well as something mysterious in this history, and it begs for
further research. There is, in my view, considerable counterpoint in
the record, which deepens the mystery of the digest. Let me mention
five points.
A. Point 1
First of all, the Legislature’s decision to use the word digest
came as an utter surprise to the outside world. In every preceding act
and resolution leading up to promulgation, the Legislature always
referred to the gestating enactment as the “Civil Code.” Unless there
is a hidden counter letter somewhere of which I am unaware, the
Legislature therefore specifically commissioned Louis Moreau
Lislet and James Brown to write a civil code, not a digest. In a
second legislative act, it fixed the compensation that the
jurisconsults and translators of the “Civil Code” would be paid.28
(By the way, in a small triumph in the course of this research, I have
uncovered the names of our sometimes maligned translators and
their relations to the principal jurists.)29 In yet a third legislative act
(and here we are only two months before promulgation when the
projet was apparently complete), the Legislature appointed a
committee of four of its own members to examine the “Civil Code”
and to report back to the full “House.”30 It is a provocative fact that
27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2.
28. 1807 La. Acts 190 (approved April 14, 1807).
29. My research identifying the translators and their role in Louisiana legal
history will be presented in a later article.
30. See LE MONITEUR DE LA LOUISIANE, Jan. 27, 1808 (referencing the
Resolution of the Legislature of June 7, 1806 and reporting the resolutions of the
Chamber of Representatives made Thursday, January 21, 1808).
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the “Digest” was not born until the eleventh hour on the eve of
promulgation. How could this be important? Well, it raises the fairly
strong possibility that the Legislature simply superimposed that
name on a work actually conceived, commissioned, and drafted as a
true code. Perhaps we are not talking about two different objects but
rather the use of two interchangeable names for the same object. In
that event the code–digest might have been as susceptible to codelike interpretation as any other code might have been. It was up to
the interpreters to decide what it was as much as the Legislature. My
conjecture, as I will now expand upon further, is that the drafters,
who I assume worked in accordance with the mandate written in the
acts, actually constructed a civil code, but the Legislature designated
it a digest.31
B. Point 2
There is some corroboration for this code thesis from a different
angle. In one of the acts announcing the forthcoming “Civil Code,”
the Legislature made a provision for the two jurisconsults to
exercise continuing oversight over its application in the courts for
five years after its promulgation. For this supervision, each was to
receive $800 per year to attend and observe proceedings in the
inferior and superior courts as much as possible and to monitor the
problems that might arise in the Code’s implementation. They
would submit their observations and recommendations to the
Legislature each year in order “to make this new Code as perfect as
possible.”32 In other words, a process of post-enactment refinement
and improvement was to be carried out, and the overall
compensation for perfecting the code was actually twice the size of
their stipend for drafting it in the first place. Now, to my mind, the
priority placed on refining and perfecting the code makes sense if
31. The clause of implied repeal was apparently a last-minute decision as
well because it is not found in the body of the work itself but only in the
promulgating act written by the Legislature. Actually, the best evidence of the
redactor’s intentions regarding the designation code or digest should be gathered
from the document itself. Professor Batiza has argued that, but for its title, it has
the completeness, coherence, and structural arrangement equivalent to that of a
true code. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual
Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971). The debate between
Professor Batiza and Professor Pascal over this nomenclature and how it relates
to the controversy over the sources of the Digest of Orleans is thoughtfully
discussed by John Cairns. See John W. Cairns, The 1808 Digest of Orleans and
1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada: An Historical Study of Legal Change (1980)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh).
32. See 1806 La. Acts 218 (Résolution Relative à la Formation d’un Code
Civil, June 7, 1806).
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the enactment was meant to be a scientific code equal in dignity to
the Code Napoléon. On the other hand, why would there be any
pressing need to “perfect” a digest that merely restated and
summarized the civil law and left so much untouched? These
provisions for continuing oversight are more consistent with an
original intention to enact a true code because it is arguably less
important to perfect a digest. And this was probably soon realized,
[because] once the code was enacted as a digest, the program of
oversight was dropped, and we have no record that the jurists
received further payments or carried out this charge.
C. Point 3
The Legislature’s decision and the judiciary’s decision to
interpret it as a digest of laws created a serious internal difficulty.
There has been no comment on this by historians, but the digest
methodology suggested by its name does not fit with the directory
provisions set forth and enacted in the Preliminary Title of the
Digest. The Preliminary Title sets forth in one provision a
methodology for the judge to follow in exceptional situations in
which the positive law is silent.33 This is famed article 21, which
found its way into all subsequent Louisiana civil codes, including
our present Code. That provision is of course the counterpart of
similar directory provisions found in the civil codes of
Switzerland, Austria, and others.
In the event of the Code’s silence, it calls for a return to equity,
to natural law, and to reason. The Louisiana provision was taken
bodily from the projet du gouvernement, which Portalis drafted for
the French Code Civil.34 In the case of the French Code, that
provision could have filled a functional need because the Code was
built as a closed system, and there must have been some way to
deal with the unprovided-for case since any deni de justice was
forbidden. All prerevolutionary sources of law had been repealed,
and the code rested on its own bottom. In the case of Louisiana,
too, it could have fulfilled the same role but logically only if we
33. DIGEST OF 1808, supra note 24, bk. 1, prelim. tit., art. 21 (“In civil
matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide
according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law
and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent.”).
34. The Livre Préliminaire, which was rejected by the code commission and
not included in the final Code Civil, was the work of Portalis who chose Domat
as his model. As Maleville noted, “Ce fut aussi sans contradiction que passa la
suppression presqu’ entière du livre préliminaire que M. Portalis avait rédigé a
l'instar du Livre des Lois de Domat, et dans lequel il avait bien surpassé son
modèle . . . .” Tucker, supra note 3, at 80 n.42.

2013]

TRACING THE ORIGINS

807

assume the redactors thought they were constructing a true code
that would be severed from the past laws. Such a provision,
however, is superfluous and contradictory under a digest, for a
digest does not involve occasional gaps; it has many gaps. It is
porous by design and surrounded by its own ius commune. The
gaps in a digest are foreseen and expected, and they are regarded
as less consequential because they will be filled not by the judge’s
concept of equity or conception of natural law but by routine
recourse to the default system in the background.35 The digest
methodology exemplified in Cottin is thus at war with an article 21
methodology, which presupposes an internal, analogical mode of
growth and development. Both cannot operate at the same time,
and I think the drafters must have known that and probably
intended otherwise. But, the last minute name change caught them
off guard. What is very interesting is that the historical record
demonstrates that article 21 did turn out to be functionally
superfluous throughout the life of the 1808 Digest, as anyone could
have predicted. I hope that I have not missed anything in the
historical record of the years 1808–1825, but after diligent search
there was not one instance in which the Louisiana judges actually
invoked or used article 21. It is true that lawyers arguing before the
court adverted to article 21 a few times,36 but there was no instance
in which the judges adopted that argument or confessed to any gap
in the Digest. Of course, they handled hundreds of cases in which
they made routine recourse to Spanish and Roman law, but that
was never considered to be article 21 gap-filling. Actually, I was
surprised to learn that it was not until 1851 that the court used
article 21 for the first time, and this of course was long after the

35. Thomas Tucker conceived that Spanish law was considered “natural
law” by the Louisiana jurists, and it was brought into play in the Louisiana
system under the Digest of 1808 by passing through article 21. Tucker, supra
note 3, at 126. I believe this theory is unhistorical. As opposed to being idealized
natural law that passed into the system where positive law was silent, Spanish
law was conceived in this period as a body of statutory law directly applicable,
so long as it had not been repealed by positive provisions found in the Digest.
The silence of the Digest was never the test of its relevance––rather nonrepeal
was. For instance, the 24-hour test applied in Cottin for determining whether a
child was considered abortive did not involve a rule of universal natural law.
Indeed the Spanish rule was idiosyncratic and not followed in any other
European system. It applied as positive law in Louisiana without any mention of
article 21.
36. See Hunt v. Norris, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 517 (La. 1816); Griffin’s Ex’r v.
Lopez, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 145 (La. 1817); Brashears v. Barrabino, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 641
(La. 1820); Poultney’s Heirs v. Barrett, 8 La. 441 (La. 1835); Fisk v. Fisk, 2 La.
Ann. 71 (La. 1847).
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Digest had been repealed.37 Thus, the presence of article 21 in the
1808 enactment is, to my mind, clear evidence that the drafters
thought that they were constructing a true code, that is until they
were told otherwise by the Legislature.
D. Point 4
There is, furthermore, a better form of evidence to show that
they wrote a code before it became a digest. There is the Code [of
1808] itself, ready to be examined. There is no exposé des motifs
accompanying the document, so we really do not know the inner
thinking of Moreau and Brown. The best evidence of their
intentions, however, is the document itself. If we disregard its title
and look at its substance, it has the completeness, coherence, and
structural arrangement equivalent to that of a true code, or so at
least a number of distinguished scholars have thought.38 When we
look closely at the provisions, it is clear that they did not slavishly
copy or merely rephrase or restate the civil laws of their time.
Choices were made and original rules were sometimes confected.
Frequently enough, they attempted to create clearer or better rules
by splicing elements from more than one tradition. For example, in
drafting the articles on redhibition applicable to the sales of slaves,
they chose to borrow French rules about the seller’s state of mind
(this offered stronger buyer protection than the Spanish rules) but
attached them to some detailed Spanish rules about the types of
defects that were actionable (this produced the division between
vices of character and defects of the body). The final combination
represented a splice of the two laws.39 In my view, a redactor
would have had very little motivation to craft new rules of this type
if he or she realized that the rule would go into a digest that would
in turn be subject once again to the very rules from which he or she
had originally chosen. The reasonable redactor would realize that a
digest methodology threatens to undermine every attempt at
37. See Thompson v. Mylne, 6 La. Ann. 80 (La. 1851); cf. Simonton’s Case,
2 Mart. (o.s.) 102 (La. 1811) (stating that the case presented a casus omissus in
the legislation, but without adverting to article 21, it was not within the power of
the court to provide a remedy).
38. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1958). Thomas Tucker, however, argues that it was
not meant to be a true code on the basis of the name of the work, the weak
repealing clause, the historical purpose behind it, and a sampling of the opinions
of contemporary historians and jurists. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 130–35.
39. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THROUGH THE CODES DARKLY: SLAVE
LAW AND CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA ch. 4 (2012). The Spanish source of the
provision was Partida 5,5,64, while the French source was Code Civile articles
1641–1646.
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originality. New rules are fated to be supplemented by the very
elements in the old sources that the drafters chose to discard.
E. Point 5
There is an additional historical fact that I will mention only
because it seems so odd. In reading over, as I said, three volumes of
Martin’s reports covering 1809–1815, Louisiana’s 1808 law is
constantly referred to as the “Civil Code” by the court and by all of
the lawyers, even though, as we know, that was not its real name. In
scouring the reports, I have found but two occasions out of hundreds
or thousands of references in published briefs and opinions in which
it is ever referred to as the Digest. The Cottin decision was of course
one of those two occasions.40 If the proper title was so consequential
to the legal mind, what can explain this almost complete disregard
of it in everyday practice? What’s in a name?
These counterpoints will not change the history books of this
period, but they may create certain inferences, add to our questions,
and deepen the mystery. Actually, we know little about this vital
period. We have no exposé des motifs, no journal, and no
explanatory letters. We have no record of the discussions between
the jurisconsults and the legislative committee, nor whether the
judges were first consulted on the naming of the enactment. And we
unfortunately have no reported cases for the critical years 1804–
1809, which might shed light on the previous interpretations given
to the relationship between local laws and the greater ius commune.
Allow me now to come back to the year 1817 because I think
we have misread its significance. It is very difficult for me to agree
after a close reading of the earliest cases that the digest method
was first discovered and applied in Cottin in 1817 and that this
holding “had the effect of reviving the Spanish law.”41 It is also
difficult to agree with an eminent author’s assertion that it was
Cottin which “gave rise to almost limitless confusion and opened the
floodgates of litigation. This decision meant that the 1808 Code
could be used in practice only as an incomplete digest of existing
laws that still retained their original force.”42 Actually, the same
method was known and used from the outset, for it plainly appears
in the first cases reported in Volume 1 of Martin’s Reports for the

40. See Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817).
41. See Hood, Jr., supra note 38, at 28.
42. A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L.
COMMENTARIES 1, 11 (2008).
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fall term of 1809.43 For instance, in Folk v. Solis (1809), it had to be
determined whether the plaintiff, who brought suit for defamation,
had a right to demand bail or surety from the defendant as a
guarantee against his departing the jurisdiction. Under a territorial
statute, a demand for bail was authorized where the action involved
wrongful injury to property or wrongful detention of property, but
the statute said nothing about the availability of bail where the
action was for defamation. Nevertheless, said the court, it remained
to inquire if the Spanish authorities (and–or English authorities)
permitted a plaintiff to demand bail from the defendant upon a
defamation claim. The court concluded that Spanish law would
allow a type of surety (the judicio sisti) in a libel action provided
certain conditions were met, but it held that, under the facts of the
case, those conditions were not met. Thus, the defendant’s bail was
discharged.44 Had the conditions been met, however, the court was
prepared to apply the Spanish judicio sisti because it was part of
Louisiana law. I have found a number of other pre-Cottin cases
where Spanish law was applied directly beyond the limits of the
Digest.45 Thus, it is seems correct to say that as early as 1809, if not
43. See Folk v. Solis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 64 (La. 1809); Beauregard v. Piernas, 1
Mart. (o.s.) 281 (La. 1811); Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 138 (La. 1812);
Brognier v. Forstall, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 577 (La. 1815); Durnford v. Syndics of
Brooks, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 222 (La. 1814); Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La.
1815); cf. Dewees v. Morgan, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 1 (La. 1809).
44. Folk, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 68 (“It seems, therefore, that the law of Spain
alone may be invoked by the plaintiffs, and as they have not complied with what
it requires, I am bound to say that they cannot have the benefit of it.”).
45. Beauregard, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 281, and Brognier, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 577, have
similar facts and present pre-Cottin examples of the digest method in action. In
the latter case, defendant, a married woman, bound herself jointly with her
husband to pay a debt to plaintiff, and the couple mortgaged slaves to secure
payment. The plaintiff exercised his mortgage rights and obtained an order of
seizure. The defendant’s wife resisted the seizure on grounds that under Spanish
law, a wife cannot become security for her husband unless the debt has been
converted to her benefit, even though she had formally renounced the law’s
protections. The Digest of 1808 was silent on the question of the capacity of a
wife to secure her husband’s debts. The court held that the defendant had
formally renounced the protections, and therefore she was bound under Spanish
law (the law of Toro) to make payment. A sample of such a renunciation by the
wife is found in an authentic act of July 9, 1810 executed in West Florida while
under Spanish rule:
And I, the said Victorina Marie de Armas, renounce all laws of Emperor
Justinian and Beleyano, senatu consultus, laws of the forum, of Madrid,
and the Partidas, all the new and old Constitutions, and any other laws for
the benefit of women, all concerning which I have been advised, and
with full knowledge of them I renounce all of them, swearing that I have
not been compelled or coerced by my said husband or any other person
to sign this act, but I have signed it of my own free will . . . .
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sooner, the courts were already directly applying Spanish law as
they also did in Cottin, and, interestingly, no attention or objection
is drawn to this in the cases. It is done in an atmosphere of normal
operating procedure.
The question becomes, therefore, not whether Cottin marked
the first use of the digest methodology––certainly it was not––but
rather to ask, What made the Cottin decision so noteworthy to
contemporaries and What made it so consequential for the later
history of this subject? It is from that date forward that the
translation of the Partidas into English was decided upon, and it
probably clinched the decision to enter upon a second round of
codification.
In my judgment, there was something special and deeply
unsettling about the decision, but it was not the novelty of the
digest method. This decision showed more graphically than any
prior decision that even the most precise rules set forth in the
Digest––whether they be those establishing the age of majority, or
the length of a prescriptive period, or, as here, the definition of an
abortive child––might all be subject to some modification or
supplementation after consultation with the background law.
The legislative technique displayed in a civil code, C.J.
Morrow once noted, establishes norms along a spectrum that
ranges from very precise rules, to more flexible and supple rules,
and on to general principles. It is, notably, those very precise rules
that are most conducive to deductive reasoning and that will
produce the most predictable and certain outcomes. Yet, when the
court reconfigured the definition of an abortive child to coincide
with Spanish law, the court demonstrated that not even the most
detailed provisions in the Digest could be regarded as incontestable
or safe from revision.46 Even a definition could be redefined under
the digest methodology. Here was a staggering blow to legal
certainty and to the reliance that the citizenry could place in the
published laws that they were expected to know––for if the
clearest, most detailed laws prove uncertain, what can be expected
to happen to its more numerous general provisions? The rock
submerged in the pail of water would seem to have turned into a

See Archives of the Spanish Government of West Florida, West Florida Papers,
no. 110, 288–89 (in translation) (on file with the Louisiana Collection, Howard
Tilton Library, Tulane University).
46. Perhaps the case also attracted attention because it affected conservative
values about inheritance and family, and the Spanish rule was idiosyncratic and
had no equivalent in European family law.
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sponge.47 The sponge would seem adrift and not the center of
anything.
From the beginning, this method had continually marginalized
the Digest, and it often led the judges to go straight to Spanish,
French, or Roman authority with only a passing glance, if any, at
the Digest itself. A representative case is one in which the question
was whether a purchaser of land could suspend payment of the
purchase price on grounds that he was in danger of eviction.48 The
particular danger alleged by the plaintiff was the existence of an
unsatisfied mortgage on the land, which the seller had not paid and
for which he was not in default. Under the Digest, a danger of
eviction meant some disturbance of the purchaser’s possession by
an “action” taken or filed against him, and nothing of that sort had
occurred. But the court never cited, quoted, or discussed the
Digest. It held for the purchaser by relying upon Domat and
Justinian’s Digest for the proposition that the mere existence of the
mortgage created a danger of eviction.49 Another case illustrating
the marginalization of the Digest involved whether a will was valid
if a witness was absent when the testator dictated his intentions to
the notary.50 In reaching its decision, the court did not cite or quote
the Digest provisions. It said merely that the Digest was in
agreement with the Spanish law that the witnesses must be present
at that moment. It quoted Febrero’s statement that they must “all at
one and the same time hear the words from the mouth of the
testator.”51 Over and over, the cases give the impression that the
Digest is secondary authority compared to the ius commune
surrounding it.
47. Or as François-Xavier Martin phrased it:
In practice, the work was used, as an incomplete digest of existing
statutes, which still retained their empire; and their exceptions and
modifications were held to affect several clauses by which former
principles were absolutely stated. Thus, the people found a decoy, in what
was held out as a beacon.
2 FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD 291–92 (1829) (emphasis added).
48. See Duplantier v. Pigman, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 236 (La. 1814).
49. Id. at 244.
50. Knight v. Smith, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 156 (La. 1813). For a further example of
marginalization, see Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 269 (La. 1812) (A
plantation overseer, a free person of color, worked for a number of years without
wages. The nuns attempted to reward him by donating two arpents of land, but
this was held to be beyond their authority and right. Further, he was not entitled
to recover the reasonable amount of his services in “quantum meruit,” but the
court did not examine the Digest provisions on natural obligations or quasicontracts. It relied on an English case denying quantum meruit under similar
circumstances.).
51. Id. at 167.
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Furthermore, the judges could often control outcomes under
the digest method at their discretion. The linchpin of the method
was actually judicial control over the issue of repeal. And much
depended upon the principles of repeal that they entertained.
Certainly, no teleological construction of “contrariness” based on
what end the code was meant to accomplish was ever raised. The
courts were wedded to a most literal and conservative theory of
repeal, drawn word-for-word from British decisions and authors
who were emphatic that implied repeals of prior statutes were
disfavored. Application of this British view favored the maximum
retention of old Spanish law because it read the implied repeal
clause as narrowly as possible. For example, Judge Mathews in De
Armas’ Case (1821) said that, to decide whether an 1813 contempt
statute abrogated the Spanish laws on attorney discipline, it was
necessary to resort to “known and established rules of abrogation
and repeal.”52 He set forth three known and established rules, but
interestingly, he did not disclose where these principles came from.
Research shows that they were in fact rules for the repeal of
common law statutes drawn from common law books. The favorite
sources were William Blackstone, Matthew Bacon’s Abridgement,
and English precedents.53 It is also important to note how
unpredictable the question of repeal could be. Litigants could never
be really sure when the court would say that Spanish law had been
repealed and when it remained in force. As stated previously, the
test of “contrariness,” or repugnancy, was generally construed as
strictly as possible to maintain the exterior Spanish law in force,
but sometimes it was applied loosely and purposively to strike
down certain disliked or inconvenient Spanish rules. The factors
behind the differing outcomes were not articulated.54 Clearly, this
interpretational discretion enhanced judicial power.
52. See De Armas’ Case, 10 Mart. (o.s.) 158, 172 (La. 1821).
53. Thus, in Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La. 1815), Judge Martin
referred to Matthew Bacon’s A New Abridgment of the Law and Lord
Mansfield’s decision in The Earl of Ailesbury v. Pattison (1778). See id. at 672.
54. For example, the “decisory oath,” which existed in Louisiana during the
Spanish occupation, was peremptorily declared “virtually” repealed by procedural
rules under the Practice Act simply because the Practice Act allowed
interrogatories to be directed to the opposite party in the case. Actually, however,
there is no necessary incompatibility between sending written interrogatories to
the party and deferring a decisory oath to that same party. Answering the decisory
oath may have conclusive effects on the outcome of the case, but there is no
reason why both the decisory oath and written interrogatories could not be used at
different stages of the same proceedings. They represent different ways of
obtaining party evidence and of assigning weight to it. In the event, however, the
superior court summarily declared that the decisory oath was repealed without
explaining why. Porche’s Heirs v. Poydras, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 198 (La. 1811). Cottin v.
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IV. A CODA ON THE DIGEST
The inner connection between maintaining Spanish law through
the digest method and maintaining the court’s own power became
more obvious over time. Matters came to a head in the second round
of codification from 1823–1828 when the Legislature attempted
mightily to sever the Spanish umbilical cord. The three jurisconsults
expressed forcefully in their preliminary report that it was necessary
to repeal “all former laws and usages defining civil rights.”55 A
Code article drafted by the senate itself contained a comprehensive
and definitive repeal of all prior laws:
From and after the promulgation of this code, the Spanish,
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State,
when Louisiana was ceded to the United States . . . are
hereby repealed in every case, for which it has been
especially provided in this code, and that they shall not be
invoked as laws, even under the pretense that their
provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this
code.56
Despite the comprehensiveness of this repeal and the advance
warning against judicial “pretense,” the judges of the supreme
court obstinately refused to give full effect to it. In a series of
decisions in 1827, the court ruled that Spanish custom was still
controlling, in another that the Partidas was still controlling, and in
a third it ruled that the new Civil Code of 1825 had not succeeded
Cottin also illustrates the discretionary element in the repeal question. 5 Mart.
(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). Counsel pointed out that under Spanish law, the baptism of a
child, even one that did not survive 24 hours, prevented it from being considered
as abortive. He also pointed out that Spanish law’s use of this religious rite as an
element in its rule made it expressly contrary to the Digest’s definition, which
made no reference to baptism. The court, however, brushed aside this disparity
and did not think that the Spanish rule was sufficiently contrary to be regarded as
repealed. Id. See also Rogers v. Beiller, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 665 (La. 1815).
55. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 179 (Preliminary Report of the Code
Commissioners, dated February 13, 1823).
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3521 (1825). This amendment passed overwhelmingly
in the House of Representatives by a vote of 26–2, with the majority comprised
equally (judging by their surnames) between Creole and American
representatives. LA. H.R. JOURNAL, 2d Sess., at 10 (Mar. 13, 1824). A further
amendment, weakening the first, was proposed and defeated by a vote of 18 to
6. This amendment would have permitted the Spanish, French, Roman, and
common law to be used for illustrating the principles of the code. The “no” vote
was again evenly comprised of Creole and American names. Cf. RICHARD
KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS, 1803–1839 (1987).
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even in repealing certain provisions of the Digest and therefore the
Digest provisions were concurrently in force.57 The Legislature
now felt called upon to respond and to reassert the repeal in more
forceful and particularized terms. It passed a first act specifically
repealing all articles contained in the Digest of 180858 and then
passed a second act declaring “that all of the civil laws which were
in force before the promulgation of the civil code lately
promulgated, be and are hereby abrogated.”59 Once again, the
judges remained intransigent and resorted to disingenuous
arguments to block the repeal. They now insisted that their own
precedents and legal decisions, if based upon “general principles”
of the civil law rather than statutes, were immune from the effects
of the omnibus repeal issued by the Legislature. Accordingly, they
held that a doctrine founded on Roman principles, which the court
had previously recognized in a case, was still controlling even after
the repeal of 1828.60 The court reasoned that legislative power
cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself
had enacted; for it is this alone which it may repeal; eodem
modo quiquit constitutur, eodem modo dissolvitur. . . . We,
therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and French
civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are the positive,
written, or statute laws of those nations, and of this state
[and] that the legislature did not intend to abrogate those
principles of law which had been established or settled by
the decisions of courts of justice.61

57. See Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. 211 (La. 1834) (decided in 1827 but not
reported until 1834); Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 229 (La. 1827); Lacroix v.
Coquet, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 527 (La. 1827); Flower v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 89 (La.
1827).
58. Act No. 40, 1828 La. Acts 66.
59. Act No. 83, 1828 La. Acts 160.
60. See Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (La. 1839). The earlier case alluded
to was Christy v. Cazenave, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 451 (La. 1824), which recognized on
the basis of Roman principles the doctrine of abandonment in the law of lease.
This claim of immunity from legislative power clearly surpassed the claim that
decisions have precedential effect for judges and should not be lightly overruled.
While the former may have been unusually radical, the latter view was advanced
frequently enough. See Dugas v. Estiletts, 5 La. Ann. 559, 559–60 (La. 1850)
(citation omitted) (“But the most distinguished of our predecessors have, in two
cases, come to a different conclusion, and based their opinions upon those of our
earliest commentators on the laws of redhibition. In the interpretation of a law, it
is a wise rule, ‘stare decisis,’ and we are obliged to adopt it in this case.”).
61. Reynolds, 13 La. at 198. The court also deemed the Louisiana Legislature
impotent to repeal the revealed law, the natural law, the law of nations and those
laws “antecedent to any positive precept.” Id.
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It could be said that this was a struggle over the lawmaking
power and over the court’s jurisprudence, but in my view it was
about the centrality of the civil code in the legal order. There was a
deep fear of a code on its own bottom, bereft of any safety net.
This seems to have been the fear of Etienne Mazureau, who
recounted the story of the repeal to Alexis de Tocqueville on his
visit to New Orleans: “The bar and the judges discovered with
horror what had been done the day before. But the thing was
done.”62 What had really been done was of course not an evil or a
horror but the final demise of the digest method. It marked a great
turning point in the history of our Civil Code.
Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps I have gone far enough with
this story to make my thesis clear that the honorable judges were
resolute defenders of their methods, their powers, and their offices.
They clung to the old law, particularly the parts now embodied in
their own jurisprudence, as they might have clung to their own
possessions. It was indeed a shocked Judge Mathews who
expressed his true feelings about the propriety of the great repeal:
The clause of repeal is sweeping in its effects, tremendously
sweeping, and an unwise or inconsiderate interpretation on the
part of the courts of justice, would have left the community
without any civil laws, except those contained in the
Louisiana Code and Code of Practice; an evil so great as to be
irreconcilable with the wisdom that must be conceded to our
legislatures.63
And yet, this was surely the turning point in the quest to implant
a true code in Louisiana. It is important to realize what the old order
was actually defending. They preferred the freedom of the open
spaces and fluid, plural sources of Spanish, French, and common
law. If discretion means the power to choose, they were in a sense
defending their own discretionary powers and resisting a legislative
bridle. Possibly the Spanish–Roman–French ius commune seemed
to them a more prestigious system of justice, nobler and better tested
than anything they believed that the Louisiana Legislature might
enact. But, in my opinion, in the final analysis, they were
unconsciously defending what we all defend every day in our legal
lives—our acquired legal culture. The judges and lawyers had
acquired their expensive libraries and mastered these laws and, in
the process, proudly identified with them. They had become, in fact,
62. Tucker, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at
106).
63. Testamentary Ex’r of Lewis v. Casenave, 6 La. 437, 441 (La. 1834)
(emphasis added).
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expert comparatists who made an eclectic synthesis of the law to a
degree seldom seen before or since. The judges felt threatened by
the Legislature’s omnibus repeal of the very sources upon which
their whole jurisprudence of the past 20 years rested. From 1825 on,
the Legislature apparently expected the judges to accept the Civil
Code as the one and only source of civil law. For the coequal
judicial branch of government, this seemed an uncomfortable and
undignified straitjacket. Their creativity would be reduced to
analogical paths within a single code rather than the freedom to
apply the justice of laws which lay beyond it. Of what use would
their learning be if it could only be deployed in the intellectual
isolation of a true civil code? What would be left of their former
liberty to seek and to find just rules from every part of the world?
Ladies and gentlemen, my time has indeed expired, and I have
not reached other episodes in this history that I intended to present.
They would have added to the evidence of the struggle to place our
civil code in the center of our system, but that is for another day.
Napoleon once said of the renowned Portalis that “Portalis would
be the most eloquent of speakers if he only knew when to stop.” I
must reluctantly obey the Emperor and break off here.
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APPENDIX A: THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW
Criminal
Law &
Criminal
Procedure
(Two
Statutes)

Commerical
Law
(uncodified)

Sources: The English &
U.S. Law Merchant U.S.
Crim. Law (and Ord. de
Bilbao).

Sources: English & U.S. Crim.
Law (but Slave crimes: Span.
Crim. Law) (1805 Act specifically
to be construed in Common Law
of England).

Civil Codes
(Private
Law)

Sources: The Digest and
Spanish, French, Roman Civil
law (and by seepage, AngloAmerican Law).

Civil
Procedure
(The
Practice
B
Act 1805)

Sources: Mixture of English,
U.S., and Spanish law;
Prerogative Writs (Quo
Warranto, Mandamus,
Prohibition, Procedendo, Habeas
Corpus) as “prescribed by the
common law.”
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